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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1(a), ACA International states that it does not 
have a parent corporation, nor is there any publicly held corporation holding ten 
percent (10%) or more of ACA International’s stock. 
AUTHORITY FOR FILING THIS BRIEF 
 ACA International has obtained consent to file this amicus curiae brief from 
counsel for all of the parties to this appeal.  Accordingly, ACA International’s 
authority for filing this brief is found at Fed. R. App. P. 29(a). 
STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
ACA International (“ACA”), formerly known as the American Collectors 
Association, Inc., is the international trade association for credit and collection 
professionals.  ACA’s members provide a wide variety of accounts receivable 
management services.1  Headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, ACA 
represents the interests of approximately 5,300 third-party collection agencies, 
attorneys, credit grantors and vendor affiliates.   
ACA members comply with all applicable federal and state laws and 
regulations concerning debt collection, as well as the ethical standards and 
guidelines promulgated by ACA.  Specifically, the collection activity of ACA 
                                                 
1 While the debt collection activities of ACA members do not meet the definition 
of “telemarketing” found at 16 C.F.R. §310.2(cc), consumers routinely appear to 
operate under the mistaken belief that creditors and their agents are somehow 
subjected to the auspices of the national do-not-call registry. 
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members is regulated primarily by the Federal Trade Commission (the 
“Commission”) pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”), 
15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq., and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”), 15 
U.S.C. §1681 et seq., in addition to analogous state laws. 
In addition, ACA members who handle accounts receivable for medical 
service providers comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (“HIPAA”) including the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable 
Health Information codified at 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164 (the “Privacy Standard”).  
Finally, ACA members who purchase debt comply with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (the “GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. §§6801 et seq.   
In addition to working under the auspices of various laws and regulations 
dealing with consumer privacy such as the FDCPA, the FCRA, the HIPAA Privacy 
Standard, and the GLBA, ACA members are also heavily involved in telephone 
contact with consumers.  ACA members engage in hundreds of millions of 
telephone calls with consumers each year on behalf of creditors.  As such, ACA 
has closely monitored developments in the area of do-not-call lists.   
As part of such monitoring, ACA submitted comments in response to the 
Commission’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning amendments to the 
Telemarketing Sales Rule codified at 16 C.F.R. §§310 et seq.  The Commission 
promulgated its final amendments to the Telemarketing Sales Rule on January 29, 
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2003.  Telemarketing Sales Rule; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580 et seq. (January 
29, 2003) (the “Final TSR”).   
As an international trade association whose members are heavily regulated 
by privacy related laws and regulations, and at the same time heavily involved in 
telephone contacts with consumers, ACA respectfully submits this brief as amicus 
curiae.  ACA does not support either party through the submission of this brief, but 
rather, hopes to aid this Court in resolution of the appeal at bar through the 
provision of insight into the issues raised by the Final TSR and the FCC Rules. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Commission, through the implementation of a national do-not-call 
registry, has sought to protect the privacy rights of consumers.  Clearly, the 
protection of consumer privacy rights is a substantial government interest.  
However, it is equally clear that commercial free speech is also a substantial 
interest entitled to certain protections. 
One of the issues presented for this Court on appeal is whether the 
provisions of the Final TSR establishing the national do-not-call registry have been 
narrowly tailored enough so as to strike the appropriate balance between consumer 
privacy rights and the commercial free speech rights of telemarketers.  Restrictions 
on commercial free speech that are not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve a 
substantial government interest can not pass constitutional muster. 
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ACA’s concern is that the provisions of the Final TSR establishing the 
national do-not-call registry may be deemed by this Court as not narrowly tailored 
enough to achieve the government’s stated interest, and therefore unconstitutional.  
A finding of unconstitutionality would likely result in further legislative efforts by 
Congress to recreate the national do-not-call registry.  Herein lies ACA’s greatest 
concern—that in the event of further legislation concerning the establishment of a 
national do-not-call registry, the scope and applicability of the provisions of the 
Final TSR may be allowed to escape the strict confines of telemarketing calls. 
In the event that this Court deems the provisions of the Final TSR 
establishing the national do-not-call registry to be unconstitutional, ACA hopes 
that this Court will provide guidance as to alternatives that this Court would 
consider constitutional.  Such guidance may possibly include the less restrictive 
alternatives available to achieve the goal of protecting consumer privacy such as 
the approach to allowing consumers to cease communications employed by the 
FDCPA, or the company-specific do-not-call list approach adopted in the original 
Telemarketing Sales Rule.  ACA hopes that such guidance would also state the 
importance of ensuring that the national do-not-call list not spill over from 
telemarketing calls into other arenas such as collection calls on behalf of creditors 
who have delivered goods or performed services, but have not been paid for such 
goods or services. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. An Issue Exists as to Whether the Provisions of the Final TSR are 
Constitutional 
 
A. Has the Government Demonstrated that the Proposed Restriction 
on Commercial Speech Directly and Materially Advances the Government’s 
Stated Substantial Interest? 
 
Resolution of the appeal at bar requires an examination and balancing of the 
privacy rights of consumers and the commercial free speech rights of the business 
community.  The Commission clearly realized this when it stated: 
Similarly, by directing that the Commission regulate the times when 
telemarketers could make unsolicited calls to consumers in the second 
enumerated item [footnote 393—15 U.S.C. 6102(a)(3)(B)], Congress 
recognized that telemarketers’ right to free speech is in tension 
with consumers’ right to privacy within the sanctity of their 
homes, but that a balance must be struck between the two that 
meshes with consumers’ expectations while not unduly burdening 
industry. 
 
68 Fed. Reg. 4613 (emphasis added). 
As a trade association whose members are governed by a diverse array of 
privacy-related laws and regulations including without limitation, the FDCPA, the 
FCRA, the HIPAA Privacy Standard, and the GLBA, ACA is keenly aware of and 
supportive of the privacy rights enjoyed by consumers.  In addition, as a trade 
association whose members spend their work day in communication with 
consumers, ACA is equally aware of and supportive of free speech rights.  
Accordingly, ACA agrees that the above-referenced tension exists, and further 
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agrees that an appropriate balance must be struck between these two vital and 
competing interests.   
The question on appeal is whether the proper balance has in fact been struck.  
If the government’s own numbers are accepted, the telemarketing industry’s right 
to free speech has already been chilled to the tune of over 50 million2 subscribers 
to the national do-not-call registry.  By all accounts, the number of subscribers to 
the national do-not-call registry will continue to grow over time.  A question for 
this Court’s consideration is whether a regulatory framework that concentrated on 
restricting the telemarketing industry’s free speech rights, as opposed to 
completely banning such rights, would better serve the Commission’s stated goal 
of striking the appropriate balance between consumers’ privacy rights and the 
business community’s free speech rights. 
 In Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public Service 
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), 
the Court set forth a four part test for determining the constitutionality of a 
restriction on commercial speech.  The Central Hudson Court held that 
commercial speech may be regulated if: (1) the speech at issue is not untruthful 
and does not concern unlawful activity; (2) the government asserts a substantial 
interest in support of the regulation; (3) the government demonstrates that the 
                                                 
2 See, footnote 7. 
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restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest; 
and, (4) the regulation is narrowly tailored.  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-565.   
It is the third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test that raise the 
constitutional issues presently before this Court.  This is in large part due to the 
dichotomy set forth in the Final TSR for the treatment of commercial 
telemarketing calls as opposed to charitable telemarketing calls.  As stated by the 
Commission itself in the Final TSR: 
The Commission believes that the encroachment upon consumers’ 
privacy rights by unwanted solicitation calls is not exclusive to 
commercial telemarketers; consumers are disturbed by unwanted calls 
regardless of whether the caller is seeking to make a sale or to ask 
for a charitable contribution. 
 
68 Fed. Reg. 4637 (emphasis added).  The Commission further stated that “A great 
many consumer email comments expressed the view that unsolicited calls disturb 
their privacy, and did not distinguish between sales calls and other types of 
solicitation calls, such as those for charities.”  Id, at footnote 685. 
Based upon the Commission’s own commentary to the Final TSR, a 
question clearly exists as to whether the Final TSR meets the third part of the 
Central Hudson test. 
While the Commission’s stated reason for promulgating the national do-not-
call registry was clearly the protection of consumer privacy rights, the Commission 
stated in a footnote that the national do-not-call registry will also serve the 
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substantial government interest of preventing fraud and abuse.  68 Fed. Reg. 4635, 
footnote 669.  However, even if prevention of fraud and abuse had been the 
Commission’s stated goal in promulgating the national do-not-call registry, the 
Commission’s own commentary to the Final TSR still calls into question the 
constitutionality of the divergent treatment afforded to commercial telemarketers 
as opposed to charitable telemarketers.  See, 68 Fed. Reg. 4628, footnote 569 
(charitable telemarketers refusing to honor requests to be placed on company-
specific do-not-call lists).  See also, 68 Fed. Reg. 4585 (“The Commission believes 
that concerns about bogus charitable fundraising in the wake of the events of 
September 11, 2001, in large measure propelled passage of §1011 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act3.”); Id., at footnote 52 (“The Commission believes the necessary 
implication of modifying the definition of ‘telemarketing’ in the USA PATRIOT 
Act is to have all provisions of the [Telemarketing Sales] Rule apply to charitable 
solicitations.”). 
                                                 
3 USA PATRIOT ACT, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001) (the “Patriot 
Act”).  §1011(b)(3) of the Patriot Act specifically amended the definition of 
“telemarketing” appearing in the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse 
Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. §§6101 et seq.) (the “Telemarketing Act”) at 15 U.S.C. 
§6106(4) to include charitable telemarketing.  §1011(b)(1) of the Patriot Act 
amended 15 U.S.C. §6102(a)(2) of the Telemarketing Act directing that fraudulent 
charitable solicitations be regulated as deceptive practices under the Telemarketing 
Sales Rule.  §1011(b)(2) of the Patriot Act added a new section to the 
Telemarketing Act directing the Commission to include new requirements 
governing charitable telemarketing within the abusive telemarketing acts or 
practices provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Act. 
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Based upon the Commission’s own comments cited above, even if the 
substantial government interest advanced by the Final TSR is assumed to be 
prevention of fraud and abuse, an issue exists as to whether the Commission’s 
divergent treatment of commercial and charitable telemarketers under the Final 
TSR directly and materially advances such interest.  As such, an issue also exists 
as to whether the Final TSR meets the third part of the Central Hudson test. 
B. Is the Proposed Restriction on Commercial Free Speech Sufficiently 
Narrowly Tailored? 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, it is the potential for the Final TSR 
to effectuate a complete and utter prohibition on commercial free speech that gives 
ACA the greatest concern.  The fourth part of the Central Hudson test requires that 
an otherwise permissible government regulation of commercial speech be narrowly 
tailored.  It is this narrowly tailored component of the Central Hudson test that 
raises the most serious question for this Court to resolve. 
It is clear that in regulating commercial speech, the government does not 
need to employ the least restrictive means available.  Board of Trustees of the State 
University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 
388 (1989).  However, as stated by the Court:  
What our decisions require is a ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and 
the means chosen to accomplish those ends…a fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the 
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the 
interest served…that employs not necessarily the least restrictive 
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means but, as we have put it in the other contexts described above, a 
means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. 
 
Id.  (Emphasis added; internal citations omitted). 
A question clearly exists as to whether the national do-not-call registry 
provisions are tailored narrowly enough to withstand analysis under Central 
Hudson and Fox.  This question is based upon a fundamental issue of whether a 
regulatory framework that effectuates the potential for a complete and utter ban on 
commercial free speech can by its very nature be considered “narrowly tailored.” 
Similarly, is the national do-not-call registry, as currently structured, a 
regulation “whose scope is in proportion to the interest served”?  Fox, supra.  
There is no question that the protection of consumer privacy rights is a substantial 
government interest.  That being said, ACA’s concern is the parade of horribles 
that may result from a system that allows a consumer to preemptively and 
completely shut the door on legitimate commercial speech, prior to even having 
had the opportunity to know the content of the commercial speech. 
Government restrictions on commercial speech are subject to an 
intermediate level of scrutiny.  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring).  While the Fox Court held that the government is not required to use 
the absolute least restrictive means to achieve its desired end, Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 
the Court certainly did not prohibit inquiry into whether less restrictive means are 
available to meet the government’s goal in enacting the challenged restriction on 
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commercial speech.  On the contrary, the Fox Court noted that “almost all of the 
restrictions disallowed under Central Hudson’s fourth prong have been 
substantially excessive, disregarding ‘far less restrictive and more precise means’”.  
Fox, 492 U.S. 469.  As such, in order to determine whether the Commission’s 
regulation of commercial speech in the Final TSR is “reasonable”, “in proportion 
to the interest served”, and “narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective” as 
required by Fox, we must examine whether less restrictive means are available for 
achieving the Commission’s goal of protecting consumers’ privacy rights with 
regard to telemarketing calls. 
II. There are Less Restrictive Means Available that Would Serve the 
Government’s Interests in Protecting Consumer Privacy Rights with Regard 
to Telemarketing Calls 
 
 A. The FDCPA’s Approach 
As noted above, ACA is no stranger to severe restrictions on commercial 
speech.  Pursuant to the FDCPA, a consumer may unilaterally require a debt 
collector to cease communications with the consumer concerning a particular debt 
simply by notifying the debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay 
the debt or that the consumer desires the debt collector to cease further 
communication with the consumer.  15 U.S.C. §1692c(c).   
Once a consumer has so notified a debt collector, the debt collector may not 
communicate further with the consumer with respect to the debt in question except: 
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(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector’s further efforts are being 
terminated; (2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may 
invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or 
creditor; or (3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or 
creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy.  Id. 
The FDCPA seems to strike a better balance between consumer rights and 
the business community’s free speech rights than the Final TSR.  Under the 
FDCPA, a debt collector has an absolute right to make an initial contact with a 
consumer in order to attempt to collect money owed by the consumer based upon a 
transaction initiated by the consumer with a creditor.  Obviously, any attempt to 
curtail this initial right of contact would have devastating consequences upon 
creditors attempting to obtain payment for goods they had previously delivered or 
services they had previously rendered to consumers.   
Upon receipt of a debt collector’s initial communication, the consumer then 
immediately obtains the right to cease any unwanted communications from the 
debt collector pursuant to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c).   
Upon receipt of a consumer’s written request to cease communication, the 
debt collector must cease any and all communication with the consumer 
concerning the debt except for one (1) of the three (3) limited exceptions set forth 
in 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c).   
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Assuming the debt collector has invoked one (1) of the exceptions stated 
above4 and made a final communication with the consumer, and the debt remains 
unpaid, the debt collector now has a choice to make: either take appropriate legal 
action to collect the debt in question, or cease all activity on the account in 
question.  One thing for certain at such juncture is that the debt collector absolutely 
may not communicate further with the consumer concerning the debt in question 
outside of the ambit of a legal proceeding. 
ACA is convinced the FDCPA strikes an appropriate balance between the 
rights of consumers and the commercial free speech rights of creditors and their 
agents.  As shown above, while the right to commercial free speech is severely 
regulated under the FDCPA, there is no outright prohibition on commercial free 
speech that would prevent a creditor or its agent from at least making an initial 
communication attempting to collect money owed.  In short, the consumer is 
provided with an opportunity to determine the nature and potential value of the 
communication, as well as the identity of the caller, thereby allowing the consumer 
to make an informed decision as to whether he wishes to communicate further with 
the caller, or to require the cessation of further communications concerning the 
debt in question. 
                                                 
4 Although not required by the FDCPA, many debt collectors do not take 
advantage of the extra communication allowed by 15 U.S.C. §1692c(c), choosing 
instead to either initiate a legal proceeding or cease all activity on the debt in 
question. 
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The Final TSR on the other hand, allows for a consumer to shut the door on 
commercial free speech before any such speech has even occurred.  As such, the 
question becomes whether a complete prohibition on commercial free speech can 
possibly be considered “a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired 
objective” so as to withstand the requirement set forth in Fox? 
B. The Problems with the Company Specific Do-Not-Call Lists Have Been 
Cured by the New Provisions of the Final TSR Requiring the Transmission of 
Caller Identification Information 
 
 Clearly, the company-specific approach to do-not-call lists taken under the 
original Telemarketing Sales Rule is far less restrictive than the national do-not-
call registry adopted by the Final TSR.  Under the company-specific approach, to 
prevent telemarketing calls from a company, consumers had5 to request that a 
specific company not contact the consumer any further.   
 According to the Commission, one of the problems encountered with the 
company-specific do-not-call lists was that consumer attempts to sign up for such 
lists were often frustrated by telemarketers.  The Commission described how 
telemarketers would often hang up on consumers who requested to be added to the 
telemarketer’s company-specific do-not-call list, with the net result being that the 
consumer had no method for identifying which telemarketer had contacted him, 
                                                 
5 The company-specific approach to do-not-call lists is still employed in the final 
TSR as the sole means for consumers to block receipt of telemarketing calls on 
behalf of charities.  16 C.F.R. §310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A); 16 C.F.R. §310.6(a). 
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and consequently, no ability to make a formal request to be placed on such 
telemarketer’s company-specific do-not-call list, or to identify a telemarketer who 
has violated the provisions of the final TSR.  68 Fed. Reg. 4626-4628.  These were 
the main reasons advanced by the Commission for the new provision in the Final 
TSR requiring all telemarketers to transmit caller identification information 
(“Caller ID”) in every telemarketing call.  Id.   
 In discussing its reasoning for requiring the transmission of Caller ID in all 
telemarketing calls, the Commission also stated that “consumers will receive 
substantial privacy protection as a result of this [Caller ID] provision.”  68 Fed. 
Reg. 4623.  The Commission continued: 
Consumers benefit because Caller ID information allows them to 
screen out unwanted callers and identify companies that have 
contacted them so that they can place “do-not-call” requests to those 
companies.  These features of Caller ID enable consumers to protect 
their privacy…The fact that consumers greatly value the privacy 
protection provided by receipt of Caller ID information is evidenced 
by the fact that, as of the year 2000, nearly half of all Americans 
subscribed to a Caller ID service. 
 
68 Fed. Reg. 4624 (footnote omitted). 
 The commentary to the final TSR seems to indicate that requiring the 
transmission of Caller ID in all telemarketing calls achieves the same goals 
advanced in support of the national do-not-call registry: 
…consumers derive substantial benefit from receiving Caller ID 
information…Consumers in large numbers subscribe to, and pay for, 
Caller ID services offered by their telephone companies.  Many of 
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these consumers subscribe to Caller ID specifically to identify 
incoming calls from telemarketers and screen out unwanted 
telemarketing calls…These consumers have, over time, come to the 
conclusion that an incoming call that fails to provide Caller ID 
information is commonly a telemarketing call.  As a result, some 
consumers decline to answer these calls.   
 
68 Fed. Reg. 4626 (footnotes omitted).  See also, 68 Fed. Reg. 4627, footnote 540 
(“Consumer prefers current state of affairs where ‘most’ telemarketers block 
transmission of Caller ID information because her Caller ID is programmed to 
refuse calls from parties who block such transmission.  Using this arrangement, the 
consumer reports receiving few telemarketing calls.”) 
By requiring the transmission of Caller ID information in every 
telemarketing call, the biggest problems with the company-specific do-not-call lists 
identified by the Commission have been cured.  Now, even if a telemarketer 
illegally frustrates a consumer’s attempt to be placed on the telemarketer’s 
company-specific do-not-call list, the consumer will have a means for identifying 
and reporting the offending telemarketer.  This will allow the consumer to make a 
formal request to be placed on the telemarketer’s company-specific do-not-call list, 
and will also aid in identifying offending telemarketers for the purpose of actions 
to enforce the provisions of the final TSR. 
 Based upon the foregoing, ACA suggests that a return to the company-
specific approach to do-not-call would resolve the issues presented in this appeal.  
A return to this approach would surely cure the constitutional issues raised in 
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Judge Nottingham’s Order in D.C. No. 03-N-0184 (MJW)6 as all telemarketers 
would be treated in the same manner.  Furthermore, the company-specific 
approach to do-not-call lists is far less restrictive than the national do-not-call 
registry provisions set forth in the Final TSR as the telemarketer is able to exercise 
his commercial free speech rights unless and until the consumer invokes his right 
to be placed on the telemarketer’s company-specific do-not-call list, thereby 
effectuating a cessation of all communications from the telemarketer.  This is an 
approach similar to the approach taken by the FDCPA as described earlier in this 
brief. 
III. Rowan Supports the Company-Specific Approach to Do-Not-Call Lists 
 Proponents of the national do-not-call registry provisions set forth in the 
final TSR routinely point to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rowan v. U.S. 
Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970) as 
constitutional support for the national do-not-call registry.  Ironically, in actuality, 
the Rowan decision provides constitutional support for the company-specific do-
not-call lists espoused in the original Telemarketing Sales Rule. 
 Rowan does not stand for the proposition that a consumer can preemptively 
put a halt to any and all commercial speech.  Quite to the contrary, pursuant to the 
                                                 
6 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Mainstream Marketing Services, 
Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, et al., Civ. No. 03-N-0184 (MJW) (D. 
Colo. Sept. 25, 2003) (“Judge Nottingham’s Order”). 
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regulation under review in Rowan, a consumer could not request that further mail 
from a particular vendor be ceased until the vendor had in fact mailed an 
advertisement to the consumer.  Rowan, 397 U.S. at 730, 734-735, 739; see also, 
id., 397 U.S. at 739, footnote 6.  Rowan, like the approach taken by the FDCPA 
and the company-specific do-not-call list provisions in the original Telemarketing 
Sales Rule, requires an affirmative request by a consumer to cease communication 
from a particular party.  In addition to being a far less restrictive curtailment of 
commercial free speech than the national do-not-call registry provisions, such an 
approach still achieves the government’s stated goal to protect consumer privacy 
rights, as the consumer maintains the ability to require any or all telemarketers to 
cease contacting the consumer.  As this alternative results in a regulation of 
commercial free speech, as opposed to a complete prohibition on such speech, 
ACA urges this Court to consider this solution or a similar alternative.   
IV. The Need to Guard Against Unintended Consequences of the Final TSR 
 Regulations at times seem to take on lives of their own.  Many times, when a 
new regulation is passed, it quickly becomes apparent that the new regulation has 
unintended and undesirable consequences. 
By way of example, and certainly not limitation, this is exactly what has 
happened with the Federal Communications Commission’s (the “FCC”) recent 
revisions to its regulations implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 
 19
47 U.S.C. §227 (the “TCPA”).  See, Rules and Regulations Implementing the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 
44144 (July 25, 2003). 
 In its rules implementing the TCPA, the FCC included restrictions 
governing the use of prerecorded telephone messages.  47 C.F.R. §64.1200(b) 
requires in pertinent part: 
All artificial or prerecorded telephone messages shall: (1) At the 
beginning of the message, state clearly the identity of the business, 
individual, or other entity that is responsible for initiating the call.  
If a business is responsible for initiating the call, the name under 
which the entity is registered to conduct business with the State 
Corporation Commission (or comparable regulatory authority) must 
be stated… 
 
47 C.F.R. §64.1200(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 
 While this regulation seems innocuous enough on its face, the problem for 
ACA members is that it is in direct conflict with 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) of the 
FDCPA.  15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) provides that: 
…without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt 
collector, or the express permission of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment 
judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection 
with the collection of any debt, with any person other than a 
consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise 
permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the 
attorney of the debt collector. 
 
15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) (emphasis added).  
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Since many debt collection companies have names that indicate they are in 
the debt collection business (i.e., ABC Collection Services, Inc.), many debt 
collectors are faced with an impossible compliance scenario when leaving a 
prerecorded telephone message.  If a debt collection company named ABC 
Collection Services, Inc. leaves a prerecorded telephone message and complies 
with 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(b)(1) of the FCC rules implementing the TCPA, the debt 
collection company risks that a third party hears the prerecorded telephone 
message thereby violating the third-party communication prohibition contained 
within 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b) of the FDCPA.  Conversely, if the same debt 
collection company, in an effort to comply with the FDCPA leaves a prerecorded 
telephone message and does not identify the company’s name, the debt collection 
company has violated 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(b)(1). 
Simply put, ACA members have been placed in the untenable position of 
choosing which federal law to comply with, the FDCPA or the TCPA.  Ironically, 
nothing in the administrative record of the FCC’s rules implementing the TCPA 
indicates any intent to regulate debt collection activities.  See, 68 Fed. Reg. 44144 
et seq.  Yet, as described above, ACA members find themselves not only 
potentially subject to the provisions of the TCPA, but also mired in a conflict 
between the TCPA and the FDCPA.  It is unintended consequences such as this 
that ACA fears most with the Final TSR.   
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V. The Final TSR Must Remain Limited Solely to Telemarketing Calls 
 Obviously, limitations on free speech are always fraught with peril.  Society 
places a high value on the free exchange of ideas.  As the Central Hudson Court 
stated: “commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the 
speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest 
possible dissemination of information.”  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-562.  
 Due to the current structure of the national do-not-call registry, the 
framework is in place to effectuate a complete ban on commercial free speech 
espoused by telemarketers.  Given the sweeping prohibitions on commercial free 
speech which are allowed under the national do-not-call registry, as opposed to the 
more narrowly tailored restrictions on commercial free speech allowed under the 
FDCPA, ACA is concerned with ensuring that the final TSR never escapes the 
strict confines of telemarketing calls in its scope and applicability. 
 Based upon the legal analysis contained in the Order entered by Judge 
Nottingham in D.C. No. 03-N-0184 (MJW), as well as ACA’s own independent 
legal research and analysis, ACA is concerned about the ramifications that may 
ensue in the event that this Court affirms Judge Nottingham’s Order and finds the 
Final TSR to be unconstitutional.  Given the recent statements of various members 
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of Congress7 concerning the strong Congressional desire for the national do-not-
call registry to continue in effect as set forth in the final TSR, it seems certain that 
Congressional reaction to this Court finding the national do-not-call registry to be 
unconstitutional would be swift. 
 Judge Nottingham’s Order found the provisions of the Final TSR concerning 
the establishment of the national do-not-call registry unconstitutional based upon 
the disparate treatment afforded to charitable as opposed to commercial 
telemarketers.  As such, in the event that this Court affirms Judge Nottingham’s 
decision, ACA feels there will be much debate within Congress over how to amend 
the provisions of the Final TSR relating to the national do-not-call registry in order 
to survive further constitutional attacks.   
 Under the final prong of the Central Hudson test requiring restrictions on 
commercial free speech to be “narrowly tailored” to achieve a substantial 
government interest, it would seem that a return to the company-specific approach 
to do-not-call lists would pass constitutional muster.  This is especially so in light 
of the amendment to the final TSR requiring Caller ID information to be 
transmitted in every telemarketing call.  Such amendment appears to cure the 
                                                 
7 See, 149 Cong. Rec. H8916-17 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Tauzin, “The FTC wants this [national do-not-call] list.  The President of the 
United States wants this list, and more importantly, 50 million Americans, who are 
growing impatient about being interrupted at mealtime by unwanted and 
unnecessary harassing telemarketing calls, want this list.  And this Congress is 
going to make sure they have this list today.”). 
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concerns with company-specific do-not-call lists enumerated by the Commission in 
the commentary to the final TSR (see discussion above in Section IIB of this brief).   
A return to the company-specific approach would also serve as a regulation 
or restriction of commercial free speech, as opposed to the current framework of 
the national do-not-call registry, which acts more as a complete prohibition on 
commercial free speech.  The company-specific approach, which is similar to the 
approach to commercial free speech restrictions espoused by the FDCPA, is also 
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rowan. 
 Another potential Congressional approach in response to this Court 
upholding Judge Nottingham’s Order would be to amend the Final TSR by 
repealing the exemption currently afforded to charitable telemarketers from the 
provisions of the final TSR relating to the national do-not-call registry.  Such a 
revision would remove the problematic disparate treatment afforded to charitable 
as opposed to commercial telemarketers in the current version of the final TSR.  
However, such a revision clearly would not be as “narrowly tailored” as a return to 
the company-specific approach to do-not-call lists.  Such a revision would not 
address the issue that as structured, the provisions of the national do-not-call 
registry amount to a prohibition on commercial free speech as opposed to a 
restriction upon commercial free speech. 
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 The approach to curing any unconstitutionality in the final TSR that 
concerns ACA most would be any revision to the Final TSR that allowed the 
provisions of the national do-not-call registry to spread beyond the strict confines 
of telemarketing calls.  As the international trade association for credit and 
collection professionals, ACA has a profound concern over any expansion of the 
national do-not-call registry that would prevent creditors or their agents from 
communicating with consumers in an effort to collect money for services 
previously rendered or goods previously delivered. 
 It is clear that there is no intent to regulate debt collection calls in the final 
TSR.  68 Fed. Reg. 4664, footnote 1020.  However, as described above in Section 
IV of this brief, regulations at times take on lives of their own.  This often includes 
expansion of the scope and applicability of the regulation in question.  Expansion 
of the Final TSR to cover activities by creditors and their agents would wreak 
havoc upon the nation’s credit and collection system.8 
 In the event that the scope of the Final TSR were ever expanded to include 
telephone calls from creditors and their agents, the most profound repercussion 
would be that consumers would then have the ability to initiate a transaction for 
goods or services, receive such goods or services, and then prevent any and all 
                                                 
8 While ACA does not believe that such a regulation could pass constitutional 
muster, the potential for future amendments to the Final TSR necessitate a 
discussion of the ramifications of such a regulation herein. 
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collection calls simply by listing their telephone number on the national do-not-call 
registry.  Obviously, such an expansion of the Final TSR would severely hinder the 
ability of creditors to receive payment for goods delivered and services rendered. 
It is important to remember that collection calls from creditors and their 
agents are calls made in response to a transaction that has been initiated by the 
consumer.  Unlike a telemarketing call, a collection call does not happen up front 
in an attempt to entice a consumer into a business transaction.  Rather, a collection 
call occurs only after a consumer has initiated a transaction, the consumer has 
received the goods or services that are the subject of the transaction, and the 
consumer has failed to pay for the goods or services.   
The Final TSR contemplates and addresses consumer-initiated transactions 
by exempting from the Final TSR telephone calls initiated by the consumer that are 
not the result of any solicitation.  16 C.F.R. §310.6(b)(4).  Similarly, most 
telephone calls initiated by the consumer in response to direct solicitations that 
provided the consumer with specified disclosures are also exempt from the Final 
TSR.  16 C.F.R. §310.6(b)(6).  As such, ACA respectfully suggests preventing the 
scope of the Final TSR from ever expanding to include telephone calls from 
creditors or their agents to collect money owed for consumer-initiated transactions.   
As shown above, maintaining this existing limitation on the scope of the Final TSR 
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comports with the manner in which the Final TSR already treats consumer initiated 
telemarketing transactions. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The provisions of the Final TSR relating to the establishment of the national 
do-not-call registry are unlike any prior government regulation on commercial free 
speech in that they allow a consumer to preemptively block all communications 
from a commercial telemarketer prior to the telemarketer even making an initial 
communication.  This effectively blocks the flow of information prior to the 
consumer even being made aware of the content of the communications being 
blocked.  This, together with the disparate treatment afforded to charitable as 
opposed to commercial telemarketers, raises concerns about the constitutionality of 
the Final TSR. 
 ACA suggests that the approach taken by the FDCPA in regulating third-
party debt collection activities strikes the appropriate balance between the rights of 
consumers and commercial free speech rights.  With the addition of the 
requirement for the transmission of Caller ID information in every telemarketing 
call, ACA further suggests that the company-specific approach to do-not-call lists 
also strikes such a balance.   
In sum, the FDCPA and the company-specific approach to do-not-call lists 
both effect restrictions upon commercial free speech.  On the other hand, the 
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provisions of the Final TSR relating to the national do-not-call registry allow for a 
complete prohibition of commercial free speech. 
 Based upon the above, ACA respectfully suggests that it is imperative that 
the scope and applicability of the provisions of the Final TSR remain strictly 
confined to telemarketing calls. 
Dated this 28th day of October, 2003.    
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